ther, as it would have burdened the already-delicate relationship between the two new states.

In June 2006 a slightly different version of this story appeared in one of Germany's leading newspapers, [164]

Second government

When a rebellion in East Germany was harshly suppressed by the Red Army in June 1953, Adenauer took full advantage of the situation and was handily re-elected to a second term as Chancellor.[165] During the 1953 election, the CDU released a controversial poster with a sinister figure in red with series of red roads leading to him, under which was written "All Marxist roads lead to Moscow".[166] Until 1959, the SPD was officially a Marxist party committed to achieving a Marxist society through non-violent methods, and the poster was saying that to vote for the Marxist SPD was to deliver the Federal Republic into Soviet hands just as surely if one were to vote for the Marxist–Leninist Communists, a message that many considered to be red-baiting.[166] The CDU/CSU came up one seat short of an outright majority. Adenauer could have governed alone without the support of other parties, but retained the support of nearly all of the parties in the Bundestag that were to the right of the SPD. For all of his efforts as West Germany's leader, Adenauer was named Time magazine's Man of the Year in 1953. In 1954, he received the Karlspreis (English: Charlemagne Award), an Award by the German city of Aachen to people who contributed to the European idea, European cooperation and European peace.

The [169] The same law excluded homosexuals, the Romani and the Sinti, Asoziale ("Asocials"-people considered by the National Socialist state to be anti-social, a broad category comprising anyone from petty criminals to people who just were merely eccentric and non-conformist), and homeless people for their suffering in the concentration camps under the grounds that all these people were "criminals".[173] Lüdtke wrote that the decision to deny that the Romani and the Sinti had been victims of National Socialist racism and to exclude the Roma and Sinti from compensation under the grounds that they were all "criminals" reflected the same anti-Gypsy racism that made them the target of persecution and genocide in the first place during the National Socialist era.[174] The decision to deny compensation to gay survivors of the concentration camps was not surprising given that the 1935 version of Paragraph 175 was not repealed until 1969.[175] As a result, German homosexuals—in many cases survivors of the concentration camps—between 1949 and 1969 continued to be convicted under the same law that had been used to convict them between 1935 and 1945, though in the period 1949–69 they were sent to prison rather than concentration camps.[175] Aside from that, other global treaties for compensation were made with other western European states in the following decades, to compensate for the Nazi crimes.[143]

The Social Democrat member of the Bundestag Adolf Arndt frequently charged that the entire Restitution Laws had less to do with any genuine desire to compensate the victims of National Socialism and were instead just an empty, hollow, cynical exercise in public relations where the Federal Republic would pay off just enough in compensation to appease public opinion abroad while at the same time the Restitution Laws were applied in such a mean-spirited, hair-splitting, and petty manner that strongly suggested that saving the German taxpayer money was the main concern.[176] Arndt used as a typical case of how the Restitution laws were worked in practice, namely the case of a Gentile German woman married to a Jewish man, who despite considerable pressure from the Nazi regime refused to divorce her husband, who was then deported and gassed at Auschwitz in 1942.[177] In 1954, the widow was refused her request for compensation given the fact that the German state murdered her husband under the grounds that "she personally had not suffered Nazi violence, and that it would have been possible to divorce her husband", and therefore by refusing to divorce her husband it was by her own "free will" that she suffered the pain of her husband being gassed at Auschwitz.[178] Arndt commented that "in no other matters did the administration and the courts treat people in such a narrow and mean way, and that nowhere else were hair- and word-splitting employed so intensely. This is the result of the foul climate of creeping anti-Semitism".[179] Lüdtke wrote that critics of Restitution Laws like Adolf Arndt, Hans Reif, Franz Böhm and Otto-Heinrich Greve were a decided minority in the 1950s without influence, and that most people at the time supported the "restrictive and mean practices" of the Adenauer government when it come to compensation for the victims of National Socialism.[180]

In the spring of 1954, the future of the Vyacheslav Molotov that the French would abandon the Pleven plan in exchange for Soviet help in ending the war in Vietnam, saying at a press conference: "I did not put the EDC in a hole in order to get a smile from Mr. Molotov...You don't trade Adenauer for Ho Chi Minh".[181] The French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 highlighted just how difficult it was for France to fight a colonial war, which led to fears in France that if France were to fight another major war to hang onto to its colonies that it would impossible to deal with Germany should Adenauer in the future be replaced with a more nationalistic German leader.[181] At the same time, the refusal of the United States to intervene in Vietnam despite the looming French defeat at Dien Bien Phu undermined French confidence in the United States, which led to many in France arguing that it was better to kill the Pleven plan rather risk a return to German militarism without U.S. protection.[181] Furthermore, the ending of France's war in Indochina meant that all of the French troops there would be recalled to France, which many of the French to conclude that they no longer needed German help if the Soviet Union should invade. Adenauer himself feared that the new French Premier, the partly Jewish Pierre Mendès France was a Germanophobe who would do anything to block German rearmament.[181] Despite Adenauer's fears, Mendès France was in fact clearly in favor of the Pleven Plan, but as he stressed repeatedly in his meetings with West German, British and American diplomats, French public opinion was not, which was why he insisted on amending the EDC treaty to further weaken Bonn's control of the German contingent to the EDC force.[181] One journalist wrote in the spring of 1954 that the Pleven Plan "had divided French opinion as had no other question since the war".[181] Neither Adenauer nor Britain and the U.S were much interested in Mendès France's proposed changes to the Pleven Plan, and told him that France could either accept the plan as it was or reject it.[182] On 19 August 1954, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill told the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that: "I am distressed at Adenauer's position. I feel we owe him almost a debt of honor after all the risks he has run and patience he has shown".[182] Churchill followed up his meeting with Dulles by sending Adenauer a telegram promising that Britain would ensure that German rearmament would happen, regardless if the National Assembly ratified the EDC treaty or not.[182] In August 1954, the Pleven plan died when an alliance of conservatives and Communists in the National Assembly joined forces to reject the EDC treaty under the grounds that German rearmament in any form and shape was an inacceptable danger to France.[183]

Following the failure of the Pleven Plan, the British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden used the rejection of the EDC treaty by the National Assembly to suggest that the Federal Republic be allowed its own military forces and be allowed to join NATO.[183] Adenauer himself, despite all his efforts in championing the EDC, was secretly pleased by the failure of the Pleven plan, as it opened the possibility of the Federal Republic having its own military, and for the Federal Republic to join NATO as he always wanted all the long.[184] Adenauer told Walter Hallstein that: "What the people there in Paris said is not entirely stupid. I've been looking over the treaty you negotiated. Well, in fact it's so not good as you have maintained."[184] By this time, Adenauer had used the four years between the introduction of the Pleven Plan in 1950 and its rejection in 1954 to build up considerable good-will in Washington, London and Paris so that the idea of German rearmament, which had seemed so shocking and appalling in 1950, seemed less so in 1954, and as a result the Eden plan met with considerable approval.[183] Furthermore, Adenauer suggested in his meetings with Eden, Dulles and Mendès France that German public opinion was gravely offended by the French rejection of the EDC treaty, and that if nothing was done to ensure German rearmament soon, then the appeal of neo-Nazi groups would increase.[185] Dulles for his part made it clear that American public opinion was growing annoyed at the sense that the Europeans were not doing their share of defending western Europe, and that unless the Europeans came up with a new plan to replace the Pleven Plan, the United States would eventually lose interest in defending western Europe.[186] To replace the Pleven plan, the British government opened a conference in London on 28 September 1954.[187] Eden assisted Adenauer by promising the French at a conference in London that Britain would always maintain at least four divisions in the British Army of the Rhine as long as there was a Soviet threat, leading Adenauer to remark: "We all impressed with the obligation that this declaration placed upon us".[188] Eden's promise of strengthened British Army of the Rhine was just as much aimed implicitly against a revived German militarism as it was aimed explicitly against Soviet Union. The French Ambassador to the Court of St. James, René Massigli wept tears of joy at Eden's speech, saying that the French had waiting for this for 50 years, ever since the Entente cordiale of 1904.[188] Adenauer then followed up Eden's speech by promising in a speech of his own that the Federal Republic would never seek to have nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as heavy warships, strategic bombers, long-range artillery, and guided missiles, albeit under certain conditions.[188] After his speech, Dulles asked Adenauer: "Herr Chancellor, are we to understand you have made this declaration-like all such international declarations-only rebus sic stantibus [under present conditions]".[188] Adenauer answered Dulles by saying: "You have interpreted my declaration correctly."[189] Adenauer's caveats were not widely not noted at the time of his speech, and the visibly moved Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak proclaimed to Adenauer's aide Count von Kielmansegg in the aftermath of his declaration renouncing various types of weapons: "Tell your chancellor, he is a greater European than I."[188] The speeches of Eden and Adenauer did much to assuage Mendès France that German rearmament would not be a threat to French security and that Britain by making the "continental commitment" (a long term goal of the French going back to the early years of the 20th century) by promising to maintain a large force in Germany would serve to check any effort at German revanchism in Western Europe. Additionally, Adenauer promised at the London conference that if the Federal Republic was allowed a military, it would be under the operational control of NATO general staff, through ultimate control would rest with the German government; that he would never launch a military action that was not in accordance with the strictly defensive NATO charter; and above all he would never invade East Germany to achieve German reunification.[190]

In May 1955, the Federal Republic was allowed to have its own military in the form of the Bundeswehr and allowed to join NATO.[183] Through Adenauer made use of a number of Wehrmacht generals and admirals in the Bundeswehr, he did not want the Bundeswehr to be a revived Wehrmacht as he deeply disliked Prussian militarism, and instead saw the Bundeswehr as a new force with no links to the past.[191] Unlike the Reichswehr, which under the Weimar Republic had functioned as a "state-within-the-state" that played a major role in bringing down the Weimar Republic, Adenauer went to great lengths to ensure the new Bundeswehr be entirely under civilian control at all times.[192] To emphasize discontinuity between the Army that had existed between 1871-1945 and the Bundeswehr, the Bundeswehr-unlike the East German National People's Army-rejected the traditional grey uniforms of the German Army. To ensure a democratic Bundeswehr, Adenauer gave a great deal of power to the military reformer Wolf Graf von Baudissin.[191] Baudissin stressed that the Bundeswehr was not the heir to the Wehrmacht, but instead he wanted "to create something fundamentally new today without borrowing from either of the old armed forces".[193] To break with the past, Baudission developed the concept of Innere Führung, in which a German soldier had the duty to disobey any criminal order from his superior, and that his first loyalty was to democracy, not the state.[194] Henceforward, German soldiers were only to be loyal to the state only as long as it upheld democracy. Baudission's reforms, especially the Innere Führung concept greatly offended many of the more traditional-minded former Wehrmacht officers serving in the Bundeswehr, who perhaps with their own experiences of World War II in mind, argued that the duty of a German soldier was to unconditionally obey any order from his superior, no matter how criminal or genocidal it might be.[194][195] Likewise, Baudissin often clashed with the traditionalist officers in the Bundeswehr over the question if the men involved in the putsch attempt of 20 July 1944 were to regarded as role models or not for the Bundewehr.[195] For the traditionalist officers, the men involved in the putsch were loathsome traitors with the retired Erich von Manstein famously declaring the putsch was "unworthy of an officer", and as such the officers who stayed loyal to Hitler should be the role models for the Bundeswehr.[195] Baudission with his concept of Innere Führung, much to the discomfort of those former Wehrmacht officers who remained loyal to Hitler pushed for the men of 20 July to be considered role models.[195]

In 1954, Adenauer's lobbying efforts on behalf of the "Spandau Seven" finally borne fruit with the release of Baron Konstantin von Neurath.[196] After Neurath was released, Adenauer sent him a telegram that read: "The news that freedom has been restored to you after long, hard years has sincerely gladdened me. I express to you, your wife and your children the heartiest congratulations couple them with my best wishes for the restoration of your health".[197] President Heuss went even further, sending a telegram that spoke of Neurath's "martyrdom" at Nuremberg, and strongly implied that Neurath had been framed by the Allies.[198] The statements welcoming Neurath's release by Heuss and Adenauer sparked controversy all over the world with one Dutch newspaper writing that the telegrams sent by the President and Chancellor to Neurath were part of a "characterless policy of opportunism" intended to win the support of those Germans who supported the Nazis and argued that a "war criminal receiving clemency" should not be treated like a "hero" as Neurath had been.[198] The British Daily Mirror newspaper ran a cartoon in which the ghosts of Hitler, Goebbels and Göring all complained that they had committed suicide too soon, and if only they were still alive in 1954, then Adenauer and Heuss would be celebrating their early release from Spandau as well.[198] At the same time, Adenauer's efforts to win freedom for Admiral Karl Dönitz ran into staunch opposition from the British Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, who argued that the charismatic, popular war hero and National Socialist fanatic Dönitz who still was utterly convinced that he was still Germany's president on the account that Hitler had named him to that post in his last will in 1945 could not have the early release that Adenauer was pressing for because Dönitz would be an active danger to German democracy.[199] Adenauer then traded with Kirkpatrick no early release for Admiral Dönitz with an early release for Admiral Erich Raeder, supposedly on medical grounds.[200]

Adenauer's achievements include the establishment of a stable democracy in West Germany and a lasting reconciliation with pension system, which ensured unparalleled prosperity for retired people. Along with his Minister for Economic Affairs and successor Ludwig Erhard, the West German model of a "social market economy" (a mixed economy with capitalism moderated by elements of social welfare and Catholic social teaching) allowed for the boom period known as the Wirtschaftswunder ("economic miracle") that produced broad prosperity. The Adenauer era witnessed a dramatic rise in the standard of living of average Germans, with real wages doubling between 1950 and 1963. This rising affluence was accompanied by a 20% fall in working hours during that same period, together with a fall in the unemployment rate from 8% in 1950 to 0.4% in 1965.[201] in addition, an advanced welfare state was established.[202]

Adenauer with the mother of a German POW brought home in 1955 from the Soviet Union, due to Adenauer's visit to Moscow
Konrad Adenauer with minister of economics Ludwig Erhard, 1956. Adenauer acted more leniently towards the trade unions and employers' associations than Erhard.

In return for the release of the last German prisoners of war in 1955, the Federal Republic opened diplomatic relations with the USSR, but refused to recognize East Germany and broke off diplomatic relations with countries (e.g., Yugoslavia) that established relations with the East German régime.[203] On 1 May 1956, the Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano admitted during a press conference in London that the Federal Republic's stance on the Oder-Neisse line was "somewhat problematic", and suggested that the Federal Republic should recognize the Oder-Neisse line in exchange for the Soviet Union allowing reunification.[204] Brentano's remark caused such an uproar with the expellee leaders arguing that he should resign, that Adenauer was forced to disallow his foreign minister, and Brentano only kept his job by claiming that he was misquoted by the British press.[204] In private, Brentano was willing to accept the Oder-Neisse line as the price of reunification, and was not misquoted in London as he claimed afterwards.[204] Away from the public limelight in a conversation with the Canadian ambassador Charles Ritchie in June 1956, Brentano called the leaders of the expellee groups "unteachable nationalists" who had learned nothing from World War II, and who did not have the right to control the Federal Republic's policy towards Eastern Europe by vetoing policy changes they disliked.[204] Brentano's press conference was meant by Adenauer to be a trial balloon to see if the Federal Republic could have a more flexible policy towards Eastern Europe.[204] The furious protests set off by Brentano's press conference convinced Adenauer that he did not command sufficient domestic support to pursue such a policy, and that the current policy of opposing the Oder-Neisse line would have to continue.[205] This caused considerable disappointment with Adenauer's Western allies, who had been applying strong pressure behind the scenes and would continue to apply such pressure for the rest of the 1950s for Bonn to recognize the Oder-Neisse line.[206] This pressure become especially acute after the "Polish October" crisis of 1956 brought to power Władysław Gomułka as Poland's new leader.[207] Gomułka was a committed Communist, but also a Polish nationalist who had imprisoned in 1951 for being insufficiently deferential to Moscow, and it was believed possible in Washington that a split could be encouraged between Moscow and Warsaw if only Bonn would recognize the Oder-Neisse line.[208] Because the Federal Republic's refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse line together with the presence of such Nazi-tainted individuals like Theodor Oberländer in Adenauer's cabinet, Gomułka was obsessed with the fear that one day the Germans would invade Poland again, which in its would mean a return to the horrors of the German occupation.[209] Gomułka feared the Germans more than he disliked the Russians, and thus he argued in both public and in private that it was necessary to keep Soviet troops in Poland to guard against any future German revanchism.[209] Because Gomułka's obsession with the Oder-Neisse line and his reputation as a Polish nationalist who spoke of a "Polish road to socialism" independent of Moscow, it was believed possible at the time that Gomułka might follow Tito's example in 1948 if only Adenauer could be persuaded to accept the Oder-Neisse line. One scholar wrote in 1962 that most Poles deeply disliked Communism, but were willing to accept Gomułka's regime as the lesser evil because they believed Gomułka's warnings that if without the Red Army, the Germans would invade again.[210] Such was the extent of Polish fears about German revanchism that as late as February 1990 the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki (who was a firm anti-Communist) stated in a speech that Red Army might have to stay in Poland until Germany had promised to firmly recognize the Oder-Neisse line as the final frontier once and for all between Germany and Poland.[211]

In 1956, during the Suez Crisis, Adenauer completely supported the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, arguing to his Cabinet that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to cut down to size.[212] Adenauer went on to tell his Cabinet that the French were justified because of Nasser's support for the FLN in Algeria, but the British were partly to blame because they "inexplicably" shut down their Suez Canal base in 1954.[213] What appalled Adenauer about the Suez crisis was that the United States had come out against the attack on Egypt, when led Adenauer to fear that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests with no thought for European interests.[213] Adenauer complained to his cabinet about the Americans' "chumminess with the Russians" as he called the United States voting with the Soviet Union at the UN Security Council against Britain and France, and the traditionally Francophile Adenauer drew closer to Paris as a result.[214] Right at the height of the Suez crisis, Adenauer visited Paris to meet the French Premier Guy Mollet in a show of moral support for France.[215] The day before Adenauer arrived in Paris, the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent the so-called "Bulganin letters" to the leaders of Britain, France, and Israel threatening nuclear strikes if they did not end the war against Egypt.[215] The news of the "Bulganin letters" reached Adenauer mid-way on the train trip to Paris, and led to several of his aides to urge him to cancel the summit with Mollet rather run the risk of staying in a city that was under the threat of a Soviet nuclear strike. Adenauer instead declared that the summit would go ahead regardless of the danger. One of Adenauer's aides Fritz von Eckardt commented about the opening ceremony in Paris where Mollet and Adenauer stood side by side while the national anthems were played that:
"When the Chancellor met members of the French government at the station, the place was full of people, who greeted Adenauer with considerable enthusiasm. A company of the Garde civile gave the salute. The German national anthem and the Marseillaise rang out. The Chancellor took the salute like a statue, motionless. I was thinking of the scene at the National Cemetery at Arlington near Washington. Even the most hard-boiled must have been touched by the significance of the moment and its symbolism. In the most serious hour France had experienced since the end of the war, the two government were standing shoulder by shoulder".[216]
During the summit in Paris, Mollet commented to Adenauer that a Soviet nuclear strike could destroy Paris at any moment, which added considerably to the tension of the summit and helped to draw the French and Germans closer together as they worked together in a city that they believed could have been vaporised in a moment.[216] Adenauer began the summit by giving Mollet a long list of complaints about the Americans, whom he accused of being unfaithful and inconsistent allies, and said he hoped to forge a Franco-German friendship that would allow the two nations to weather together any sort of crisis.[217] The Paris summit helped to forge a psychological bond between Adenauer and the French, who saw themselves as fellow European powers living in a world dominated by Washington and Moscow.[218]

As a result of the Suez crisis, Adenauer reached the conclusion that the United States was not as dependable ally as he had believed, and the Europeans would have to do more to look after their own defense, and above all the link with France needed to be strengthened.[219] Adenauer was deeply shocked by the Soviet threat of nuclear strikes against Britain and France, and even more by the apparent quiescent American response to the Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation against two of NATO's key members.[220] The Bulganin letters threatening Soviet nuclear strikes against the main British and French cities showcased Europe's utter dependence upon the United States for its security against Soviet nuclear threats while at the same time seeming to show that the American nuclear umbrella was not as reliable as billed.[221] Adenauer was especially worried by the fact that the American embassy in Bonn would not provide a clear answer as to what was the American policy in response to the Bulganin letters.[216] As a result, Adenauer through not abandoning the idea of an Atlantic alliance with the United States, become more interested in the French idea of a European "Third Force" in the Cold War as an alternative security policy.[222] This helped to lead to the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, which was intended to be the foundation stone of the European "Third Force".[223]

When, in 1967, after his death at the age of 91, Germans were asked what they admired most about Adenauer, the majority responded that he had brought home the last German prisoners of war from the USSR, which had become known as the "Return of the 10,000". Adenauer reached an agreement for his "nuclear ambitions" with a NATO Military Committee in December 1956 that stipulated West German forces to be "equipped for nuclear warfare".[224] Concluding that the United States would eventually pull out of Western Europe, Adenauer pursued nuclear cooperation with other countries. The French government then proposed that France, West Germany and Italy jointly develop and produce nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and an agreement was signed in April 1958. With the ascendancy of Charles de Gaulle, the agreement for joint production and control was shelved indefinitely.[225] President John F. Kennedy, an ardent foe of nuclear proliferation, considered sales of such weapons moot since "in the event of war the United States would, from the outset, be prepared to defend the Federal Republic."[226] The physicists of the Max Planck Institute for Theoretical Physics at Göttingen and other renowned universities would have had the scientific capability for in-house development, but the will was absent,[227] nor was there public support. With Adenauer's fourth-term election in November 1961 and the end of his chancellorship in sight, his "nuclear ambitions" began to taper off.

Third government

Signing the NATO treaty in Paris, 1954 (Adenauer at the left)

1957 saw the reintegration of the Saarland into West Germany . The election of 1957 essentially dealt with national matters.[227] His re-election campaigns centered around the slogan "No Experiments".[54] Riding a wave of popularity from the return of the last POWs from Soviet labor camps, as well as an extensive pension reform, Adenauer led the CDU/CSU to the first—and as of 2014, only—outright majority in a free German election.[228] In 1957, the Federal Republic signed the Treaty of Rome and become a founding member of the European Economic Community. In September 1958, Adenauer first met President Charles de Gaulle of France, who was to become a close friend and ally in pursuing Franco-German rapprochement.[229]

The famous election poster of 1957: "No experiments"

Throughout the 1950s, the East German leader Walter Ulbricht had been pressuring the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev for an end to West Berlin, maintaining that the German Democratic Republic could not prosper as long as West Berlin existed as an escape valve for unhappy East Germans.[230] In February 1958, the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany Mikhail Pervukhin suggested to Khrushchev that "the Berlin question can be resolved independently from resolving the entire German problem, by the gradual political and economic conquest of West Berlin".[230] On 10 November 1958, Khrushchev gave a bellicose speech warning that he wanted to see the end of West Berlin, which he called a "cancer" in East Germany and then on 27 November another Berlin crisis broke out when Khrushchev submitted Ultimatum with a six-month expiry date to Washington, London and Paris.[231] Khrushchev demanded that the Allies pull all their forces out of West Berlin and agree that West Berlin become a "free city", or else he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.[230] A Soviet-East German peace treaty would mean at least officially the ending of the Soviet rights in their zone of Germany.[230] Every since 1945, American, British and French forces had enjoyed access rights to West Berlin through East Germany, and to do so, they had dealt with the Soviet forces.[230] Ending the Soviet rights in East Germany would meant to enjoy their access right to West Berlin the Allies would now have to deal with the East Germans rather the Soviets.[232] Under the Hallstein Doctrine, Adenauer had a policy of breaking off diplomatic relations with any state except for the Soviet Union that recognized East Germany.[232] Thus, a Soviet-East German peace treaty would mean that the Allies would to recognize East Germany to use their access rights to West Berlin and have Adenauer break off relations with them or alternatively the Allies would have to give up on their access rights to West Berlin if they did not wish to deal with East Germany.[233] The plans for the "Free City of Berlin" were regarded by everyone at the time including most importantly Khrushchev as a mere prelude to the East German annexation of West Berlin, and as a providing a face-saving way for the Allies to pull out of West Berlin before the East Germans marched in.[233] Alternatively, if the Allies did recognize East Germany, and Adenauer then enforced the Hallstein Doctrine by breaking diplomatic relations with Washington, Paris and London, then all of Adenauer's work towards integrating the Federal Republic into the West would be undone at one stroke.[233] From Khrushchev's viewpoint, either outcome would be equally desirable for the Soviet Union, and he believed that the crisis could only be resolved in his favor because the only way in which the Western powers could continue enjoy their access rights to West Berlin without recognizing East Germany would be war, and Khrushchev did not believe the West would risk World War III for the sake of Berlin.[233] At the time that Khrushchev presented his ultimatum in 1958, he was said to have made the remark that "Berlin is the testicles of the West. Every time I want to make the West scream, I squeeze on Berlin".[231]

The U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles suggested that the American response to Khrushchev's ultimatum should be to recognize and deal with the East Germans as "agents" of the Soviet Union, something that Dulles hoped might be an acceptable compromise.[232] In a message to the U.S President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Adenauer stated that any form of American recognition of East Germany, even as Soviet "agents" would mean that West Germany would enforce the Hallstein Doctrine by breaking off diplomatic relations with Washington.[232] Eisenhower complained privately that thanks to Adenauer's threat to enforce the Hallstein Doctrine that this was "another instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military positions that are wholly illogical" and that average American would have trouble understanding why thermonuclear war was being risked because "we worry about the shape of the helmet of the official to whom we present credentials".[232] Eisenhower decided that rather than risk a rupture with Bonn, that the Americans would refuse to have any dealings with the East Germans, and come 27 May 1959 if a Soviet-East German peace treaty was signed, then an American platoon would be sent to fight its way across East Germany to West Berlin.[232] If the platoon was repulsed, then an American armored division would be sent to fight its way to West Berlin in order to create a situation as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff put to convince the world that U.S. "would use whatever degree of force may be necessary" to enjoy its access rights to West Berlin without dealing with the East German regime.[232] Dulles during a visit to Bonn in February 1959 told Adenauer that if the division was rebuffed in its attempt to access West Berlin, the U.S. would go to war with the Soviet Union, a war "in which we obviously would not forego the use of nuclear weapons".[232] Adenauer, who never much liked Berlin is said to have told Dulles in horror: "For God's sake, not for Berlin!".[232] Adenauer had already been informed by NATO planners in 1955 that the use of tactical nuclear weapons alone in Germany should World War III break out would release enough radiation to kill about 1.7 million German civilians at once and hospitalize about 3.5 million Germans civilians with radiation-related injuries.[232] This estimate of German civilian casualties were for tactical nuclear weapons alone, and excluded the dead and wounded expected from the use of conventional weapons. Adenauer was opposed to the American plan to fight their way across East Germany as the consequences of a Third World War from the German point of view were too horrific, but at the same time was opposed to any sort of negotiations with the Soviets, arguing if only the West were to hang tough long enough, Khrushchev would back down.[234]

As the 27 May deadline approached, the crisis was defused through not resolved by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who visited Moscow to meet with Khrushchev to discuss the Berlin crisis over the objections of Adenauer who believed that Macmillan would seek a compromise that would in some way imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic.[232] Macmillan failed to get the resolution of the Berlin crisis he was seeking, but managed to win time by getting Khrushchev to extend the deadline by promising a four-power conference on a solution while not committing himself or the other Western powers to concessions.[232] The four-power conference that was to discuss the Berlin crisis was the abortive Paris summit of May 1960 that was cancelled due to the U-2 incident. Adenauer-who was always inclined to believe the worst about the British-was livid about the Moscow summit, and believed quite wrongly as it turned out, that Macmillan had made a secret deal with Khrushchev at the expense of the Federal Republic.[235] At a subsequent Anglo-German summit between Adenauer and Macmillan to discuss the Berlin crisis was quite frosty with the two leaders being barely civil to one another.[235] At the end of the Moscow summit, an Anglo-Soviet communiqué was released, which spoke in very vague terms of the British and Soviet governments' desire to end the nuclear arms race and a solution to the "German question" that would be satisfactory to all parties.[236] Adenauer saw the Anglo-Soviet communiqué as a sign that Macmillan had surrendered too much to the Soviets, and did nothing at the Bonn summit with Macmillan to hide his displeasure.[236] Adenauer saw Macmillan as a spineless "appeaser" unable and unwilling to stand up to Khrushchev, and in a 1965 interview was to call Macmillan "stupid" for holding the 1959 summit with Khrushchev.[237] The dislike between Macmillan and Adenauer was mutual. In his diary entries from 1959, Macmillan variously described Adenauer as "half crazy", "... a false and cantankerous old man", and "... vain, suspicious and grasping".[238] Macmillan argued that Adenauer by opposing all talks with the Soviets was taking a needlessly intransigent line on the Berlin crisis that was likely to plunge the world into a nuclear holocaust, and argued the best solution to the Berlin crisis was to follow Churchill's dictum that "jaw-jaw-jaw" was always better than "war-war-war".[239] By contrast with his poor relations with Macmillan, Adenauer enjoyed excellent relations with General de Gaulle of France, whom Adenauer saw as a "rock", and the only foreign leader whom he could completely trust.[240] One of Adenauer's aides Heinrich Krone wrote in his diary in early 1959 that: "The Chancellor is intent on the closest partnership with France".[236]

Adenauer briefly considered running for the office of Federal President in 1959. Adenauer's biographer Hans-Peter Schwarz commented that through Adenauer was normally very cautious and careful when making decisions, but at times, Adenauer would act recklessly and impulsively with no thought for the consequences.[241] Adenauer had tarnished his image when he announced he would run for the office of federal president in 1959, only to pull out when he discovered that under the Basic Law, the president had far less power than he did in the Weimar Republic. Adenauer believed that he could re-reinterpret the powers of the presidency in such a way as to be an effective power-player instead holding a merely ceremonial post by attending cabinet meetings (the Basic Law was silent on whether the president could attend cabinet meetings or not).[242] In a letter that showed signs of much anger, President Heuss wrote to Adenauer that he had always worked to prevent him from attending cabinet meetings, and argued that having established that precedent, was now very annoyed by Adenauer's idea if he was elected president, he would chair cabinet meetings.[243] Additionally, the departing and respected Theodor Heuss had established the precedent that the president be nonpartisan, which clashed with Adenauer's vision.[244] After his reversal he supported the nomination of Heinrich Lübke as the CDU presidential candidate whom he believed weak enough not to interfere with his actions as Federal Chancellor. For a couple of weeks in 1959, Adenauer considered leaving the chancellorship and becoming Federal President. He initially believed the office could be fulfilled in a more politically active way than president Heuss did. He reconsidered, among other reasons, because he was afraid that Ludwig Erhard, whom Adenauer thought little of, would become the new chancellor.

By early 1959, Adenauer came under renewed pressure from his Western allies, especially the Americans and the French to recognize the Oder-Neisse line with the Americans being especially insistent.[245] The Americans argued that Adenauer's revanchist statements about the Oder-Neisse line were a godsend to Communist propaganda in Poland, and that the best way of countering the Communist claim that the Federal Republic was out to stage a new Drang nach Osten, thereby requiring the Red Army to protect the Poles was for Adenauer to publicly accept the Oder-Neisse line.[246] In response to the Franco-American pressure, the Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano suggested as a way of gaining "breathing space" was for the Federal Republic to sign non-aggression pacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia, which would imply recognition of the Oder-Neisse line without formally saying so.[247] Since it was extremely unlikely that the Poles would ever willingly return the Recovered Territories to Germany, realistically war was the only way that the Germans could ever hope to challenge the Oder-Neisse line, so by signing a non-aggression pact with Poland would effectively mean accepting the Oder-Neisse line.[248] In response to Brenatno's proposal, Adenauer gave his "explicit and unconditional approval" to the idea of non-aggression pacts in late January 1959, and for next several months, West German officials met with American, British and French diplomats to discuss in conditions of great secrecy the texts of the suggested non-aggression pacts.[249] Crucially, Adenauer did not inform either the Ernst Lemmer, the Minister of All-German Affairs or the Theodor Oberländer Minister of Refugees as the former was close to the expelle lobby while the latter was one of the leaders of the expelle lobby.[250] In March 1959, Adenauer had a rare public rift with his friend General de Gaulle of France, when de Gaulle publicly urged Adenauer to recognize the Oder-Neisse line, a statement which promoted a press release from Chancellor's office which firmly declared the Chancellor believed that "the German borders are still those of December 30, 1937".[251] At the same time, the London Times ran an article documenting the most of the leaders of the powerful expellee lobby had been active National Socialists, and some had been war criminals such as the SS officer Hermann Krumey, who after the war led one of the Sudeten expelle groups.[252] The article charged that by refusing to recognize the Oder-Neisse line and promoting the idea of Heimatrecht that Adenauer had been "keeping alive the sentiments and hatreds" expressed by the expellee lobby.[252] By late April 1959, the texts of the proposed non-aggression pacts were largely finished, and all that remained was to present them to the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia.[253] But before that could happen, the New York Times on 21 May 1959 leaked the news of the proposed non-aggression pacts.[254] The expellee lobby reacted with open dismay, charging that the non-aggression pacts were only the first step towards accepting the Oder-Neisse line and the loss of the Sudetenland, and called Adenauer's commitment to the cause of the expellee lobby "a mere illusion".[255] Adenauer had never laid claim to the Sudetenland, but the Sudeten German expellee groups had been quite open in expressing their views that the Munich Agreement was still in effect in their opinion, and as such the Germans had the right to invade Czechoslovakia to take back the Sudetenland, which had been "illegally" occupied by Czechoslovakia since 1945.[256] Adenauer insisted that he was still opposed to the Oder-Neisse line, and that the proposed non-aggression pacts did not change that fact, but this argument fooled almost no-one. The expellee lobby knew well that without the option of war that the Oder-Neisse line would remain unchanged (Adenauer's argument that the Poles could somehow be persuaded to peacefully return the land lost by the Oder-Neisse line did not impress many), which is why they were so outraged by the idea of a non-aggression pact with Poland.[257]

In June 1959, Adenauer attended a four-day rally organized by the expellee lobby in Cologne during which he promised that his government would never cease demanding Heimatrecht for the expellees, declared that the [260] Faced with this pressure, Adenauer promptly capitulated to the expellee lobby, telling his cabinet on 22 July 1959 that there would be no vote on approving the non-aggression pacts while at same time telling Brentano to inform the American, French and British governments that the idea of the Federal Republic signing the non-aggression pacts was now dead.[261] Adenauer explained to the cabinet he had killed his own plans for non-aggression pacts because of the "several hundreds of thousands of votes" held by the All-German Bloc/League of Expellees and Deprived of Rights, which he believed that the CDU could win in the 1961 elections provided that the CDU stayed in the good graces of the expellee lobby.[262]

In late 1959, a controversy broke out when it emerged that Theodor Oberländer, the Minister of Refugees since 1953 and one of the most powerful leaders of the expellee lobby had committed war crimes against Jews and Poles during World War II.[263] Oberländer had been in command of the Nachtigall Battalion which between 2–4 July 1941 shot about 7, 000 people mostly Jews and Polish intellectuals in what is now the Ukrainian city of Lviv.[264] Oberländer admitted to having commanded the Nachtigall Battalion in July 1941, but insisted in an interview with Die Zeit on 9 October 1959 that "not a shot was fired" by his men, maintaining that no massacre had taken place.[264] Despite his past, on 10 December 1959, a statement was released to the press declaring that "Dr. Oberländer has the full confidence of the Adenauer cabinet".[265] Der Spiegel ran a cover-story on Oberländer and an editorial written by Rudolf Augstein commented that "This man should never have been appointed a minister".[265] Even other Christian Democrats made it clear to Adenauer that they would have liked to see Oberländer out of the cabinet, and finally in May 1960 Oberländer resigned.[266]

Fourth government

The mood had changed by election time in September 1961. Over the course of 1961, Adenauer had his concerns about both the status of Berlin and US leadership confirmed, as the Soviets and East Germans built the Berlin Wall. Adenauer had come into the year distrusting the new US President, John F. Kennedy. He doubted Kennedy's commitment to a free Berlin and a unified Germany and considered him undisciplined and naïve.[267]

For his part, Kennedy thought that Adenauer was a relic of the past, stating "The real trouble is that he is too old and I am too young for us to understand each other." Their strained relationship impeded effective Western action on Berlin during 1961.[268] The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the sealing of borders by the East Germans made his government look weak. His "reaction was ... lame;" he eventually flew to Berlin, but he appeared to have "lost his once instinctive, ultra-swift power of judgement".[269] Rather than visiting West Berlin right after the construction of the Berlin Wall had began to show solidarity with the people of Berlin, Adenauer chose to remain on the campaign trail, and a disastrous misjudgement in a speech on 14 August 1961 in Regensburg chose to engage in a personal attack on the SPD Mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt saying that Brandt's illegitimate birth had disqualified him from holding any sort of office.[270] Adenauer's attempt to make Brandt's illegitimate birth the major campaign issue at the time that the Berlin wall was going up was widely seen as a crude effort to distract attention from the Berlin Wall, and as a mean, low personal attack over an issue that Brandt had no control over.[270] Reflecting the popular mood, the tabloid Bild ran a famous headline on its cover that read: "The East has acted. What is the West doing? The West is doing nothing! Kennedy is silent, Macmillan goes fox hunting and Adenauer insults Willy Brandt!".[270] After failing to keep their majority in the general election 36 days after the wall went up, the CDU/CSU again needed to include the FDP in a coalition government. To strike a deal, Adenauer was forced to make two concessions: to relinquish the chancellorship before the end of the new term, his fourth, and to replace his foreign minister.[271] In his last years in office, Adenauer used to take a nap after lunch and, when he was traveling abroad and had a public function to attend, he sometimes asked for a bed in a room close to where he was supposed to be speaking, so that he could rest briefly before he appeared.[272]

During this time, Adenauer came into increasing conflict with the Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard over just what precisely the Federal Republic was integrating into. Erhard was very much in favor of "widening" the EEC by allowing other nations, especially Britain to join while Adenauer was all for "deepening" the EEC by strengthening ties amongst the original founding six nations of West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy.[273] Erhard, a firm Atlanticist supported the idea of Britain joining the European Economic Community, which he saw as only the first step towards the creation of a gigantic trans-Atlantic free trade zone embracing all of Western Europe, the United States and Canada.[273] Adenauer was against Erhard's Atlanticist plans, telling him that "We must first solidify the European economic and political community before we even consider the question of an Atlantic community".[273] A month later, in a speech Adenauer rejected the idea of an Atlantic economic community with a stern warning that free trade with the United States would hinder German prosperity.[274] Shortly afterwards, in an interview Adenauer stated that he was all in favor of an alliance with the United States, but at the same time there were important cultural differences between Americans/British "Anglo-Saxons" and continental Europeans that required a certain distance for the alliance to work.[275] Adenauer argued that: "We Europeans have an ideology, the ideology of Christian humanism, which forms the foundation for the freedom of the individual and the state as a whole ... But the Anglo-Saxons ... make the same mistake; they have no ideology, no supporting idea driving resistance and the struggle against the totalitarian atheism of Russia and Red China".[276] Thus, in Adenauer's viewpoint, the Cold War meant that the NATO alliance with the United States and Britain was essential, but the same time, there could be no deeper integration into a trans-Atlantic community beyond the existing military ties as that would lead to a "mishmash" between different cultural systems that would be doomed to failure.[277] Through Adenauer had tried to get Britain to join the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951-52, by the early 1960s Adenauer had come to share General de Gaulle's belief that Britain simply did not belong in the EEC.[278] An more outspoken advocate of this viewpoint was his ambitious Defense Minister, the leader of the CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, who become by the early 1960s the leader of a fraction known as the "German Gaullists", so-called because they shared General de Gaulle's hostile views about the United States as an ally, and for the need for a Bonn-Paris axis to act as a "Third Force" in the Cold War.[279]

Berlin plaque commemorating restoration of relations between Germany and France, showing Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle.
Konrad Adenauer with Israeli President Zalman Shazar, 1966.

In October 1962, a scandal erupted when police arrested five Der Spiegel journalists, charging them with espionage for publishing a memo detailing weaknesses in the West German armed forces. Adenauer had not initiated the arrests, but initially defended the person responsible, Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, and called the Spiegel memo "abyss of treason". After public outrage and heavy protests from the coalition partner FDP he dismissed Strauss, but the reputation of Adenauer and his party had already suffered.[280][281]

Adenauer managed to remain in office for almost another year, but the scandal increased the pressure already on him to fulfill his promise to resign before the end of the term. Adenauer was not on good terms in his last years of power with his economics minister Ludwig Erhard and tried to block him from the chancellorship. In January 1963, Adenauer privately supported General Charles de Gaulle's veto of Britain's attempt to join the European Economic Community, and was only prevented from saying so openly by the need to preserve unity in his cabinet as most of his ministers led by Ludwig Erhard supported Britain's application.[282] A Francophile, Adenauer saw a Franco-German partnership as the key for European peace and prosperity and shared de Gaulle's view that Britain would be a disputative force in the EEC.[283] Adenauer failed in his efforts to block Erhard as his successor, and in October 1963 he turned the office over to Erhard. He did remain chairman of the CDU until his resignation in December 1966.[284]

Adenauer ensured a truly free and democratic society, which had been almost unknown to the German people before — notwithstanding the attempt between 1919 and 1933 (the Weimar Republic) — and which is today not just normal but also deeply integrated into modern German society. He thereby laid the groundwork for Germany to reenter the community of nations and to evolve as a dependable member of the Western world. It can be argued that because of Adenauer's policies, a later reunification of both German states was possible; and unified Germany has remained a solid partner in the European Union and NATO. The British historian Frederick Taylor argued that Federal Republic under Adenauer retained many of the characteristics of the authoritarian "deep state" that existed under the Weimar Republic, and that in many ways the Adenauer era was a transition period in values and viewpoints from the authoritarianism that characterized Germany in the first half of the 20th century to the more democratic values that characterized the western half Germany in the second half of the 20th century.[285]

The German student movement of the late 1960s was essentially a left-wing protest against the conservatism that Adenauer—by then out of office—had personified. Radical student protesters and Marxist groups were further inflamed by strong Anti-Americanism fueled by the Vietnam War and opposition to the conservative Nixon administration.[286]

In retrospect, mainly positive assessments of his chancellorship prevail, not only with the German public, which voted him the "greatest German of all time" in a 2003 television poll,[287] but even with some of today's left-wing intellectuals, who praise his unconditional commitment to western-style democracy and European integration.[288]

Death

Adenauer delivering a speech at the March 1966 CDU party rally, one year before his death
Funeral service for Adenauer in Cologne Cathedral
Adenauer's grave in Rhöndorf.

Adenauer died on 19 April 1967 in his family home at Rhöndorf. According to his daughter, his last words were "Da jitt et nix zo kriesche!" (Cologne dialect for "There's nothin' to weep about!")

Konrad Adenauer's state funeral in Cologne Cathedral was attended by a large number of world leaders, among them United States President Lyndon B. Johnson. After the Requiem Mass and service, his remains were taken upstream to Rhöndorf on the Rhine aboard Kondor, with two more Jaguar class fast attack craft of the German Navy, Seeadler and Sperber as escorts, "past the thousands who stood in silence on both banks of the river".[289] He is interred at the Waldfriedhof ("Forest Cemetery") at Rhöndorf.

Honours

ST, St, St. or st may refer to:

  • St, or St., a contraction of Saint, especially in Christianity (female Ste)
  • St, or St., a contraction of Street, a public thoroughfare
  • St, or St., a contraction of Strait, a body of water
  • Short ton, a unit of mass equal to 2000 lb, or one ton in the United States
  • Stere, a unit of volume equivalent to one cubic meter, used to measure cordwood
  • St, Stoke as a unit for viscosity
  • Stone (weight), a unit of mass used in the British Isles and other countries
  • in ordinal number abbreviations, such as 1st and 21st

Academia

  • s. t. (sine tempore, Latin for "without time") indicates that a lecture will begin at the exact time; this is in contrast to "c.t." (cum tempore, Latin for "with time"); see Academic quarter

Business and Organization

Computer

Language

  • , or st, a typographic ligature
  • ST, the ISO language code for the Sesotho language
  • stet, a printer's proofing mark on manuscripts

Mathematics, medicine and science

Media, music, and entertainment

Transport

Other uses

This article incorporates information from the equivalent article on the Deutsch WorldHeritage.

Time magazine named Adenauer as Man of the Year in 1953.

Legacy

Adenauer was the main motive for one of the most recent and famous gold commemorative coins: the Belgian 3 pioneers of the European unification commemorative coin, minted in 2002. The obverse side shows a portrait with the names Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak and Konrad Adenauer.

Adenauer cabinets

First ministry

Changes

  • 13 October 1950 – Robert Lehr (CDU) succeeds Heinemann as Minister of the Interior.
  • 15 March 1951 – Konrad Adenauer becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as Chancellor when the Allies allow this post to be revived.
  • 19 July 1952 – Fritz Neumayer (FDP) succeeds Wildermuth (died 9 March) as Minister of Construction.

Second ministry

Changes

  • 7 June 1955 – Theodor Blank (CDU) becomes Minister of Defense when that post is revived.
  • 8 June 1955 – Heinrich von Brentano (CDU) succeeds Adenauer as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (DP) succeeds Hellwege as Minister of Bundesrat Affairs.
  • 19 October 1955 – Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) becomes Minister of Atomic Affairs
  • 12 November 1955 – Tillmanns leaves the cabinet.
  • 16 October 1956 – Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) succeeds Blank as Minister of Defense. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz succeeds Neumayr as Minister of Justice. Kraft and Schäfer leave the Cabinet. Siegfried Balke (CSU) succeeds Strauss as Minister of Atomic Affairs.
  • 15 November 1956 – Ernst Lemmer (CDU) succeeds Balke as Minister of Posts and Communications.

Third ministry

Changes

  • 13 September 1959 – Werner Schwarz (CDU) succeeds Lübke as Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry.
  • 5 April 1960 – Oberländer resigns as Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims.
  • 4 May 1960 – Hans Wilhelmi (CDU) succeeds Lindrath (died 27 February) as Minister of Federal Economic Possessions.
  • 27 October 1960 – Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (CDU) becomes Minister of Displaced Persons, Refugees, and War Victims.

Fourth ministry

Changes

  • 19 November 1962 Ewald Bucher (FDP) succeeds Stammberger as Minister of Justice. Werner Dollinger (CSU) succeeds Lenz as Minister of Federal Treasure.
  • 14 December 1962 – Rolf Dahlgrün (FDP) succeeds Starke as Minister of Finance. Bruno Heck (CDU) succeeds Wuermeling as Minister of Family and Youth Affairs. Hans Lenz (FDP) enters the ministry as Minister of Scientific Research. Rainer Barzel (CDU) succeeds Lemmer as Minister of All-German Affairs. Alois Niederalt (CSU) succeeds Merkatz as Minister of Bundesrat and State Affairs. The Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Water is abolished, and Balke leaves the cabinet.
  • 9 January 1963 – Kai-Uwe von Hassel (CDU) succeeds Strauss as Minister of Defense.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ "Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967)". 
  2. ^ Richard Hiscocks, The Adenauer era (1975) p. 290
  3. ^ a b David W. Del Testa, ed. (2001). "Adenauer, Konrad". Government Leaders, Military Rulers, and Political Activists. Westport, CT: Oryx Press. p. 4.   – via Questia (subscription required)
  4. ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 p. 81
  5. ^ a b Schwarz, Hans-Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 56
  6. ^ Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer (1995) 1:94
  7. ^ Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer (1995) 1:97–99
  8. ^ a b Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 539.
  9. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 539-540.
  10. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 540-541.
  11. ^ Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer (1995) 1:128–31
  12. ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 17.
  13. ^ Mitchell, Maria The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2012 page 20.
  14. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 536.
  15. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 541.
  16. ^ Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 pages 541-542.
  17. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 179-182.
  18. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 182.
  19. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 183.
  20. ^ a b c d e Epstein, Klaus "Adenauer and Rhenish Separatism" pages 536-545 from The Review of Politics, Volume 29, Issue # 4, October 1967 page 542.
  21. ^ a b Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 page 184.
  22. ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 page 88
  23. ^ Jenkins, Roy Portraits and Miniatures, London: Bloomsbury Reader, 2012 pages 81 & 88
  24. ^ Williams, p. 201.
  25. ^ Williams, p. 212.
  26. ^ Cited by Peter Koch: Adenauer. Reinbek 1985
  27. ^ Letter to the Prussian Interior Minister of 10 August 1934 (after his firing), available online in: http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/index.php?msg=10045 Additional letter of 18 September 1962 that confirms the content of the 1934 letter, both reproduced in: Delmer, Sefton; Die Deutschen und ich; Hamburg 1963, S.751 (1962 Faksimilie), 752-60 (1934)
  28. ^ http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13521797.html. 
  29. ^ 29. Juni 1933: Letter to Dora Pferdmenges, Köln, of Maria Laach, available online in: http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/index.php?msg=10048 and also in the book review: Hans-Peter Schwarz: Adenauer. Der Aufstieg 1876–1952. In: Der Spiegel, Nr 40, 1986 online at: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13521797.htm
  30. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pages 322–323
  31. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995, pages 321–323
  32. ^ Schwarz, Hans Peter Konrad Adenauer: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995, page 323
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References and bibliography

  • Ahonen, Pertti. "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era," Central European History (1998) 31#1 pp 31–63 in JSTOR
  • Cudlipp, E. Adenauer (1985)
  • Frei, Norbert Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past The Politics of Amnesty and Integration New York: Columbia University Press, 2002
  • Granieri, Ronald J. The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966 (2004) 250 pages excerpt and text search
  • Heidenheimer, Arnold J. Adenauer and the CDU: the Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party (1960)
  • Herf, Jeffrey Divided Memory The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997
  • Hiscocks, Richard. The Adenauer Era (1966)
  • Rovan, Joseph. Konrad Adenauer (1987) 182 pages excerpt and text search
  • Schwarz, Hans-Peter. Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction. Vol. 1: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952.
    • Schwarz, Hans-Peter. vol 2: Konrad Adenauer a German politician and statesman in a period of war, revolution and reconstruction (1995) 759 pp. excerpt and text search vol 2; also full text online
  • Williams, Charles. Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany (2001), 624pp
  • "Konrad Adenauer" in Encyclopædia Britannica (Macropedia) © 1989
  • Tammann, Gustav A. and Engelbert Hommel. (1999). Die Orden und Ehrenzeichen Konrad Adenauers,

Primary sources

  • Adenauer, Konrad. Memoirs, (4 vols. English edition 1966–70)

External links

  • The short film A DEFEATED PEOPLE (1946) is available for free download at the Internet Archive []
  • The short film Interview with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1957) is available for free download at the Internet Archive []
Political offices
Vacant
Title last held by
Dietlof von Arnim-Boitzenburg
as President of the Prussian House of Lords
President of the Prussian State Council
1921–1933
Succeeded by
Robert Ley
Vacant
Title last held by
Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
as Leitender Minister
Federal Chancellor of West Germany
1949–1963
Succeeded by
Ludwig Erhard
Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs
1951–1955
Succeeded by
Heinrich von Brentano di Tremezzo